On the Costs of a Monetary Union by Bernardino Adão et al.





This article revisits the issues in the optimal currency area literature, as in Mundell (1961) and a more
recent literature, on the optimal choice of an exchange rate regime. This literature focuses on the fol-
lowing question: what are the costs of a fixed exchange rate regime when there is a role for
stabilization policy?
The literature usually suggests that when different shocks hit different countries or when there are dif-
ferences across countries in the effects of shocks, monetary policy - which has a stabilization role due
to the existenceof nominal rigidities in the economy, may have to react differentlyin the different coun-
tries. Because of this heterogeneity it is common to infer that there are costs of coordinating monetary
policies, either through a fixed exchange rate regime or a monetary union. Building on Mundell (1961)
the literature concludes that these costs are higher the stronger are the asymmetries,the more severe
are the nominal rigidities, the more pronounced is the incompleteness of international asset markets,
the less mobile is labor, and, finally, the less able is fiscal policy in effectively stabilizing the national
economies (Corsetti, 2005).
In this article weshowthat whenboth fiscal and monetarypoliciesare consideredjointly, and assumed
to have the same flexibilityin response to shocks, the loss of the countryspecific monetarytool is of no
cost.
1 This is true irrespectiveof the asymmetryin shocks and the transmissionmechanisms, in partic-
ular the severity of the nominal rigidities. The elements that are crucial in assessing the costs of a sin-
gle monetary policy are the degree of labor mobility and the effectiveness of fiscal policy, but labor
mobilityworksin the opposite wayto the conventionalwisdom.In fact onlyif labor is not mobile across
countries is fiscal policy able to eliminate the costs of a monetary union .
These results are derived in a standard two country model. Each country specializes in the production
of a set of tradeable goods. The technologies used in the production of these goods are the simpler
ones: labor is the only input and productivity does not depend on the scale of production. Labor is not
mobile across countries. Money is used by households of every country for transactions of every con-
sumed good: both the goods produced at the country and goods imported from abroad. The govern-
ment of each country consumes goods produced at home. The expenditure realized in public
consumption must be financed by every government with distortionary taxes and seigniorage. The tax
instruments arestandardlinearlaborincomeandconsumptiontaxes.There isnon-contingentnominal
public debt in each currency that can be traded internationally and private agents issue
state-contingent private debt which can be traded inside each country.
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(1) This article is a summary of the results developed inAdão, Correia and Teles (2006).2. THE METHODOLOGY
As said before wewantto be able to answerthe question of whetherthe transition from a monetary re-
gimewherethemonetaryauthorityhasfullautonomytoadifferentregime,namelyamonetaryunionor
a specific exchange rate regime, reduces the choices of a decision maker (or of a set of decision mak-
ers). This is a particularlyinteresting question whennational monetary policies have a potential stabili-
zation role due to the presence of nominal rigidities. Since wewantan answerthat is robust to the type
of price rigiditywewillnot derive the result using a particular typeof rigidity, like prices set one periodin
advance, price-setting àl aCalvo (1983), or any type of state-dependent price setting. Alternativelywe
will determine the conditions that should be satisfied in an equilibrium where prices were flexible and
the exchangerate wouldalso be flexible.We willsee the role that fiscal and monetaryinstruments play
in that environment. Namely we will show that there is a strong interaction between any policy instru-
ment, either fiscal or monetary, and between these instruments and the characteristics of the path of
equilibriumprices. We are able to showthat even if monetarypolicyis common to both economiesand
the producer price level does not react to states, or change over time, the same set of equilibrium allo-
cations can be achievedin equilibrium.If this is the case, in an economywithfixedexchangerates and
price rigidities those restrictions on price setting will not be active, and the same set of allocations that
was derived in the flexible prices and flexible exchange rates economy could be achieved.
3. THE MODEL
The economyhastwocountriesofequalsize,thehomecountryandtheforeigncountry(denotedby*).
In eachcountrythereis a representativehouseholdwithpreferencesoverthe goodproducedat home,
 CC ht ht ,,
* , the good produced abroad,  CC ft ft ,,
* and over hours of labor in the market,  NN tf
* .
Households need money for transactions of goods.
In each country there is a continuum of firms. Each firm produces a distinct, perishable consumption
good with labor only.
Fiscal and monetary policy is undertaken by a government in each country. The aggregate consump-
tion of the publicgoodis exogenousandhas to be financedwithtaxeson the consumptionof the home
good, ht ,  ht ,
* , taxes on the consumption of the foreign good, ft ,  ft ,
* , taxes on labor income, Nt ,
 Nt ,
* , taxes on profits and seigniorage.
In each period tT  01 ,,..., , whereT can be made arbitrarily large
2, the economy experiences shocks.
In the particular model analyzed these shocks for the private sector are determined by changes in
technologies and by changes in policies.
There are markets for goods, labor, money, state-contingent debt and state non-contingent debt. The
labor market is segmented across countries. The state-contingent debt market is segmented across
countries and across households and governments. The goods and the state non-contingent debt are
tradeable across countries and agents. We assume that firmi sets prices,   Pi Pi ht ft ,,
* , , every period
with contemporaneous information. We also assume that exchange rates, t, are flexible.
The conditions for the optimal decisions on consumption and saving can be described in the following
way: the household should be indifferent between using one unity of home money in the consumption
of the home good today or saving this unit of money. If the household chooses to save then there are
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(2) The assumption of a finite, even if arbitrarily large, time horizon considerably simplifies the analysis and is as reasonable an assumption as the more
standard one of an infinite horizon.two possible alternatives. Afirst one is to buy the home non-contingent asset whose yield is the gross
interest rate (Rt). Asecond possibility is to convert the unit of the home money into foreign money and
then buy the foreign non-contingent asset which pays the gross interest rate (Rt
*). The return of any of
these applications can be used to buy consumption of the home good tomorrow. Let us call these opti-
mizing conditions, two for each household, the intertemporal conditions.
In addition households have to decide on the total consumption decomposition, into home and foreign
good, and on the decisionof consumingversus supplyinglabor. Anyof these decisionrules equatethe
marginal rate of substitution of two goods
3 to the relative price of these goods paid by the household.
The decision over the consumption of home versus foreign good implies that the marginal rate of sub-
stitution has to be equated to their relative price, i.e. the terms of trade, gross of taxes paid on the con-
sumption of every good. In the second decision, of consumption versus labor supply, the relative price
istherealwage,netoflaborincometaxesandgrossoftheconsumptiontax.Noticethatwhendeciding
on consumption versus labor the nominal interest rate,  RR tt ,
* , is a price to add to the producer price
ofthegoodplustaxes,becausetransactionsofgoodsforconsumptionhavetoberealizedwithmoney.
As the household has to forgo the interest rate in order to hold money instead of other assets, this is
usually described as leisure being a credit good and consumption a cash good. Let us call this set of
conditions, two for each household, the intratemporal conditions.
The pricing conditions describe the firms’ behavior and imply that firms set prices that are a mark-up
over marginal costs. In the special case of flexible prices studied here the mark-up is constant given
assumption of a constant elasticity of substitution across goods, and marginal costs are constant due
tothechoiceofalinearproductionfunction.Noticethatweimposethattechnologyisidenticalforevery
good produced in every country. This implies that technological shocks, i.e. a change in the productiv-
ity of labor at home or abroad, should be interpreted as sectorial shocks that coincide in this
environment with national shocks.
Our purpose in this section is to assert a major result of the paper, that has implications for equilibrium
allocations with sticky prices and fixed exchange rates. We show that for any given equilibrium alloca-
tion CCN CCN h tf tth tf tt ,, ,
*
,
** ,, ,,,in the described economy, the equilibriumconditions that characterize the
flexiblepriceandtheflexibleexchangerateenvironmentcanbesatisfiedwithdifferentcombinationsof
policies and prices. That is, there is not a unique wayto decentralize
4 a chosen allocation. Aparticular
combination is the one where exchange rates are constants over time as well as producer prices.
The main proposition follows:
PROPOSITION 1:
5 Any flexible equilibrium allocation can be implemented with a particular policy
such that producerpricesare constant across states andover time,for every good, andthe exchange
rate is fixed.
Proposition1  P P P P and R R ht h ft f t t t ,, ,
*
,
** ,,    00 0  .
If the allocation CCN CCN h tf tth tf tt ,, ,
*
,
** ,, ,,, is an equilibrium allocation in the economy above this
means that there exist a set of policies and prices that satisfies everyone of the conditions that we de-
scribed. These prices and policiesin generalwouldbe time and state dependent.For example,the ex-
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(3) Amarginalrateofsubstitutionbetweenanytwogoodsdescribesthemaximumamountofonegoodthehouseholdisdecidedtogiveupinordertohaveone
additional unity of the other good.
(4) As we are working with market economies the decision maker cannot impose to private agents a chosen allocation. It is called decentralization the way
throughwhichthatallocationcanbechosenvoluntarilybyprivateagentsinamarketeconomy. Policymakersusepolicyinstrumenstthataffect pricesand
the value of assets such that free choices through the market coincide with the chosen allocations.
(5) See the proof in Adão, Correia and Teles (2006).change rate would change with the state of the economy and prices would fluctuate over time. Let us
give some intuition on how the same allocation can be supported by different policies that guarantee
constant prices and exchange rates. In order to do this, we would evaluate whether the clearing and
optimizing conditions of households and firms in the economy are satisfied for a given allocation and
two different sets of policies and prices, set 	 (which is not constrained) and set 
 where producer
prices and exchange rates are constant over time.
The clearing conditionsfor everygood, and for labor in everycountry, are triviallysatisfied since the al-
locationisthesame.Thereforewehavetocheckhoweveryagentcanchoosethesamequantitiesand
firms set constant prices, for the fixed exchange rate.
Let us beginbythe pricesetting conditions.It is easyto verifythat a constant pricelevelcan be the out-
come of firms’ choice once the nominal wage rate in every country reacts to the country technological
shocks. To see this, note that a constant producer price level implies a constant marginal cost and this
can be achieved if the wage rate in every country reacts completely to changes in productivity.
When the exchange rate is fixed the intertemporal conditions of the households in every country imply
thatRR tt 
*. Let us take a particular path for this common interest rate. Using the intratemporal condi-
tions we can verify that the choice of labor and of consumption of the local good can be the same if the
real wage net of taxes is the same in the set 	and in the set 
. We can use the tax on labor income to
guarantee that, in every date and state, this is true. The choice over the two aggregate goods, home
and foreign consumption, is determined by the terms of trade, again gross of consumption taxes. This
choice would be the same if, in every country, the tax on the imported good is adjusted to maintain the
terms of trade gross of taxes constant across set 	and set 
.
We still have to verify that the common nominal interest rate is identical to the expected real interest
rate plusthe expectedinflationof consumerprices. Sinceweare maintainingthe realinterestrate con-
stant, because the allocation is the same, the choice of a common interest rate and of constant pro-
ducer prices has to be adjusted by the expected tax on the consumption of the home good, in every
country. This tax on every state will be chosen to guarantee the private budget constraint. As we con-
strain the environment to the non-existence of state contingent assets,
6 the change of the tax on the
home consumption good across states, allows for a consumer price that is state dependent, even
when the producer price is constant over time. This state-dependent consumer price allows for de-
flated nominal assets to be also state-dependent, and can therefore satisfy the private budget
constraint, for every state and date.
Finally,wejusthavetoverifythehomebudgetconstraint,ornationalsolvency,thatguaranteesthatthe
amount of real external assets can finance the flow of future trade balance deficits, for every date and
state. These are the conditions that, given the allocations and the new path for the producer prices,
would determine the interest rate path, which as said before, is common to both countries.
This exercise can be repeated for any allocation that is an equilibrium for the case where prices and
exchange rates are flexible.
We have thus shown that for any equilibrium allocation, CCN CCN h tf tth tf tt ,, ,
*
,
** ,, ,,, , the equilibrium
conditions can be satisfied by asset positions, prices and policies such that producer prices and ex-
change rates are arbitrary constants,PP PP ht h ft f t ,, ,
*
,
* ,,   00 0  . This means that the full set of equi-
librium allocations can be implemented under fixed exchange rates with producer prices in both
countries that are constant over time. It is important to highlight the particular role played by taxes in
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(6) Althoughthereexiststate-contingentassetstradedbetweenhouseholdsineverycountry,inequilibriumthenetsupplyoftheseassetsfortherepresentative
household in every country is zero.the equilibrium with constant producer prices and exchange rates. In general different shocks in differ-
ent countries lead to changes in relative prices. If producer prices and the exchange rate are constant
then such relative price changes can only be achieved by changes in the consumption taxes in one
good relative to the other. Consumption taxes play another role, when public debt is non-contingent,
which is that of replicating state-contingent real debt. We have assumed, as is standard in this litera-
ture, that internationally traded assets are state non-contingent. Nominal interest rates, that in a fixed
exchange rate regime are common across countries, can play the role of replicating state-contingent
internationaldebt. Consumptiontaxesalsoaffect the householdsdecisionsbetweenconsumptionand
labor. Labor income taxes will have to adjust for those effects. Since prices are constant and techno-
logicalshocksinthetwocountriescanbedifferent,thenominalwageswillhavetomoveinresponseto
shocks and move differently in different countries. Money supply will also have to move to respond to
shocks to satisfy the transactions role of money. Afixed exchange rate , which should be equal to one
in the case of a monetaryunion, leads to the result that nominalinterest rates are equalizedbut money
could be distributed across countries in a very asymmetric way.
4. STICKY PRICES
One first implicationof the result in the Propositionis that fixedexchangerates do not restrict the set of
allocations under flexible prices. This is an interesting result in itself, in particular, as in our model,
whenassetmarkets areincomplete.However, theissueof whethertherearecosts of afixedexchange
rate regime is typically associated with the presence of some type of price rigidity, as argued by Fried-
man (1953). If there are restrictions on how producer prices are set, and exchange rates are fixed, it
may be the case that there will be restrictions on the relative prices of the goods produced in the
different countries.
It is particularlysurprising that fixed exchangerates do not restrict the set of allocationsalso whenpro-
ducer prices are constant over time. Can both producer prices and exchange rates be constant over
time? Yes, as long as taxes can change so that the terms of trade, real wages, and debt levels can
move with the shocks.
We now assume that prices are sticky in some or in all goods produced. We assume that firms set
prices as in Calvo (1983) staggered price setting,
7 which is a commonly used assumption in the sticky
price literature. We assume that firms set prices in the currency of their country. In each country, start-
ingfrom anhistoricalcommonprice,at everydate,eachfirm canoptimallyset its pricewithsomeprob-
abilityless than one, that can differ across countries. As there is a continuumof firms, this probabilityis
also the share of firms that optimallyrevise the price in each period. In general, staggeredprice setting
leads to inefficient differences in prices across firms. Although in a given country firms are otherwise
identical, have the same linear technology and face identical demand functions, they may charge dif-
ferent prices. Thus, the relative price of the goods they produce may be different from one. The only
case in which this will not occur is when firms that in each period have the opportunity of choosing a
new price decide to maintain the same price. The price setting restrictions in this case will not be bind-
ing and the producer price level in each country will be constant. The equilibrium conditions will be
identical to the equilibrium conditions of the flexible price economy when producer prices are constant
across periods.
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do it. Once the firm gets this opportunity she will decide setting a price that is a constant mark-up on the weighted sum of future marginal costs.Since, as stated in Proposition 1, it is possible under flexible prices to implement the full set of equilib-
rium allocations with constant prices and fixed exchange rates, it follows that under sticky prices it is
also possible to implement that same set, also with fixed exchange rates.
The proposition follows.
PROPOSITION 2:In aworldeconomywith non-contingentbondmarkets andCalvo(1983) staggered
price setting there is no cost of a fixed exchange rate regime, independently of the degree of price ri-
gidity.
In Proposition1 weshowedthat the set of allocationsunderflexibleprices is implementedwithpolicies
that generate constant prices and exchange rates, equal to arbitrary numbers. For the policies that in-
duce prices to be equal to the historical initial prices of the Calvo firms, Ph,0 and Pf,
*
0, and exchange
rates equal to anyconstant,
8 the equilibriumconditionsunder Calvo (1983) willbe exactlythe ones un-
der flexible prices. This establishes that the flexible price set of allocations is feasible with Calvo price
setting and fixed exchange rates. This set is also the optimal, in the sense that for every allocation in
the set under sticky prices, there is one in the set under flexible prices, that is a potential Pareto im-
provement.
9
The result in Proposition 2 can be extended to any other form of price stickiness, such as prices set in
advance, Taylor (1980) staggered prices, or Rotemberg (1982) adjustment costs of changing prices.
For the case where prices are set in advance, let the initial pricesPh,0 andPf,
*
0 be exogenously given
and the other period pricesPht , andPft ,
* be set in advance fork periods, for a finitek. Proposition 1 im-
plies that addingthose restrictions to the flexibleprice economystill allowsto implementthe set of allo-
cations under flexible prices, in a fixed exchange rate regime. The argument of welfare dominance of
the flexible price set also applies here.
We have analyzedflexible versus fixed exchange rate regimes. The analysisclearly followsthrough in
a monetary union. The interest rate will be common as under fixed exchange rates and equal to one.
The money supply in each country obviously does not have to be the same.
We have assumed that prices are set in the currency of the producer. We could alternatively have as-
sumed local currency pricing. The results would follow through. For the policies that support constant
producer prices and constant exchange rates, local currency price setting restrictions would not have
any impact. Contrary to what is argued extensively in the literature that does not allow for fiscal policy
instruments, it does not make a difference whetherprices are set in the currencyof the producer or the
consumer.
5. LABOR MOBILITY
In the literature of optimal currency areas the lack of labor mobility is one of the justifications for the
costs of a monetaryunionwithasymmetricmembercountries.Aresultof this paperis that the opposite
is true. Labor immobility is a necessary condition for the irrelevance of the exchange regime.
Proposition 1 was stated for the case where labor cannot move across countries. It does not apply
when labor is mobile. To see this we assume that workers can choose to work in foreign firms and re-
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(8) The exchange rate could be equal to one for the case of a monetary union.
(9) It isclearthatunderstickypricesthereareallocationsthatarenotimplementableunderflexibleprices.Thatisthecasewheneverotherwiseidenticalfirms
setdifferentprices.Itturnsout,asweshowinAdão,CorreiaandTeles(2006),thatthesetofflexiblepriceallocationsdominatesintermsofwelfaretheset
of allocations under sticky prices. Since agents are heterogeneous across countries, the meaning of welfare dominance is the usual one, of a potential
Pareto movement where lump sum transfers between agents are implicitly assumed.main being taxed at home. They consume at home. This is one way of modelling labor mobility. There
are alternative ways but the same arguments go through.
For the home households, total laborNt is split between work at homeNht , and work abroadNft , ,
NN N th tf t  ,, . (1)
Similarly for the foreign country,Nt
* is split betweenNht ,
* , which is labor in the home country, andNft ,
* ,
which is labor in the foreign country,
NN N th t ft
**
, ,
*  . (2)
The market clearing conditions in the goods market is:
 CCG A NN ht ht t t ht ht ,,
*
,,
*    (3)
 CCG A NN ft ft t t ft ft ,,
*
,,
*    (4)
whereAt and At
* represent, respectively, the productivityat home and at the foreigncountry. Therefore
 AN AN tt tt
**is total productionat home (the foreign country)whenprices are flexible.The conditionsof
the households problem are the same except for an additional arbitrage condition on where to work,
that equates the two wages
WW tt t 
* (5)
Notice that full labor mobility implies one additional constraint per state to the equilibrium conditions.
The wage in the same currency must be equal across countries. As shown in the proof of Proposition
1, there are multiple policies that support each allocation under flexible prices withconstant prices and
exchangerates. These degreesof freedomwereusedto maintainprices andexchangerates constant
overtime. Theyarenotenoughto satisfytheadditionalequilibriumrestrictions,describedinconditions
(5), which are as many as the number of states in every period.
When labor is mobile, and prices are sticky, the exchange rate regime matters. In particular, whilewith
flexibleexchangerates it is possibleto implementthe set of allocationsunderflexibleprices, that is not
the case in a fixed exchange rate regime.
Notice that when we say that with labor mobility there are costs of a fixed exchange rate regime, while
there are no such costs when labor is immobile, we are not claiming that labor mobility is undesirable.
We are not comparing environments with and without labor mobility, but rather environments with and
without fixed exchange rates, when labor is immobile or when it is mobile.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Under a flexible exchange rate regime, monetary policy in each country can freely respond to shocks,
may respond to country specific shocks or may respond differently from other countries to common
shocks. Instead, in a monetary union there is a unique monetary policy for the members of the union.
This implies restrictions in the use of policy; the exchange rate must be constant over time and the
nominalinterest rate must be equalacross countries. Are these restrictions relevant to achievethe op-
timal equilibriumallocations?Does the answerto this questionchangewiththe introductionof nominal
rigidities, like staggered price setting?
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resultingfromthelossinabilitytousepolicyforstabilizationpurposes.Thecostsaretakentobehigher
the stronger are the asymmetries across countries in shocks and their transmission, and the stronger
are the nominal rigidities. Instead, we show that in an environment with nominal rigidities, the type of
price setting (producer currency pricing or local currency pricing) and the exchange rate regime
(whether flexible or fixed exchange rates) are irrelevant once fiscal policy instruments are taken into
account. This is the main result of the paper. We also show that in order for the costs of the monetary
union to be zero labor cannot be mobile.
Onepossibleobjectiontoouranalysis,aswellastotherelatedliteraturethatusesbothfiscalandmon-
etarypolicyinstruments, is that wedonotincorporateinformationalrestrictionsinthepolicychoiceand
also do not take into account lack of ability to commit. The assumptions of private information on the
part of the government and inability to commit in the presence of a time inconsistency problem may
justify policy that does not respond to contingencies, such as illustrated with the inflation cap in the
analysis in Athey, Atkeson and Kehoe (2005). But once we want to take into account these consider-
ations for the use of fiscal instruments there is no reason why the same arguments should be
exclusively for those and not extended to monetary instruments.
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